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1.  Introduction 
The  economic  analysis  of  innovative  activities  has  a  long  history. 
The  late  sixties  and  the  seventies  saw  a  first  wave  of 
contributions,  that  were  mainly  decision  theoretic  approaches 
analysing  the  impact  of  existing  and  potential  rivalry  on  timing 
of  innovative  ventures,  using  the  at  that  time  flourishing 
mathematical  control  theory  (see  Kamien  and Schwartz  (1976)). 
A  second life cycle of research brought  a  first attack of  game 
theory  on  the  field and  this  occurred during  the beginning  and  mid 
eighties  (see  Reinganum  (1989)).  It  resulted  in  a  high  level  of 
sophistication  in  the  analysis  of  innovative  activities,  with 
stochastic  differential  games  investigating  expenditure  patterns 
in  racing  efforts  and  stochastic  settings  being  employed  to 
analyse  asymmetric  games  in  innovation,  such  as  those  played  by 
incumbents  and  new  entrants. 
In  the past  ten years  then,  we  have  witnessed  a  third wave  in 
the  1.0.  analysis  of  innovation,  with  the  game  theoretic  analysis 
of  spillovers  in  oligopoly.  Spillovers  refer  to  the  voluntary  or 
involuntary  leakage  of  knowledge  or  know-how  within organizations, 
such  as  firms  and  joint  ventures  as  well  as  between  creative 
individuals  and  organizations.  It  extensively  uses  multiple-stage 
games  that  often  abstract  from  timing  issues  and  are  technically 
somewhat  "easier"  to  handle  than  the  sophisticated  earlier 
contributions  of  the  first and  second wave  of analysis. 
Roughly  speaking  the  first  waves  of  analyses  focused  on  the 
timing  of  introduction of  innovative activities.  But  in  a  world  of 
global  economies  and  technological  changes  such  as  superhighways 
facilitating  transfer  of  often  exponentially  growing  information, 
it is  likely  that  the  challenge  for  players  may  not  always  be  to 
be  among  the  first  to  produce  the  new  information,  but  may  instead 
be  how  to  recognize,  obtain,  employ  and  complement  the  relevant 
innovative  information.  The  real  challenge  for  firms  and Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  2 
economles  may  be  to  recognize  the  resources  that  are  necessary  for 
the  appropriate  organization  of  innovative  inforrration  activities 
entrepreneurial  talents,  appropriate  industrial 





diffusion of  technology,  and of  education and science activities. 
The  recent  literature  on  spillovers  and  innovative  activities 
has  begun  to  shed  some  light  on  these  issues  and  although  many 
questions  are still left  unanswered,  it may  be  worthwhile  to  take 
a  short  pause  and  try  to  assess  where  we  are.  It  is  not  the 
ambition  to  review all  results  here,  but  instead  the  intention  is 
to  emphasize  and  clarify  a  number  of  points  that  do  not  seem  to 
have  received the attention they deserve. 
The  usual  complaint  against  modern  theoretical  1.0.  is  that 
all  results  are  too  much  model- or  even  parameter  specific.  For 
each  situation  there  is  a  model,  and  we  nowadays  see  scholars 
sometimes  formulate  practical  recommendations  on  the  basis  of  a 
highly  specific  model  and  a  few  numerical  examples.  For  each 
situation  we  have  a  different  explanation,  but  the  search  for 
robust  insights  seems  to  be  out  of  fashion  (Sutton(1992)).  But 
spillover  effects  do  show  a  certain  robustness  across  various 
models,  although it obviously  takes  some  patience  to  discover  the 
similarities.  Still,  annoying  artifacts  or  specifics  remain. 
Rather  than  to  resolve  those it may  be  better to  move  to  different 
grounds:  away  from  symmetric  settings  and  from  too  simple  modeling 
of  innovative activities. 
A  following  section provides  some  background on  spillovers  and 
innovative  activities.  The  effects  of  symmetric  spillovers  on  the 
difference  between  innovative  efforts  with  and  without  cooperation 
and  on  performance  are  detailed  next.  Finally  the  attention  goes 
to  consequences  of  asymmetric  spillovers  and  to  urgent  issues  on 
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2.  Spillovers 
Many  business  strategies  have  to  take  into  account  the 
interdependencies  or  spillovers  on  the  demand  and  production  side. 
Spillovers  hereby  often  refer  to  the  side  effect  of  the  strategy. 
Advertising  effects  for  one  brand  may  spillover  to  other  brands; 
a  good  (or  a  bad)  experience  with  one  product  of  a  brand  may  have 
positive  (negative)  effects  on  other  products  of  the  same  brand; 
innovative  investments  by  one  firm  may  reduce  or  enhance  the 
competitiveness 
human  capi  tal) 
of  a  rival  producer;  inputs  (e.g.  physical  or 
purchased  by  a  purchasing  firm  may  allow  quality 
improvements  or  cost  reductions  that  cannot  fully  be  appropriated 
by  the selling unit  (Griliches  (1992)). 
But  in  many  cases  spillovers  indicate  the  transmission 
(leakage  or  transfer)  of  useful  knowledge  and  know  how.  This  is  a 
potential  source  of  confusion.  It  is  possibly misleading  to  think 
of  such  an  information  transmission  as  being  synonymous  of 
positive  side  effects  or  externalities.  Research  and  development 
that  improves  the  competitiveness  of  one  firm  may  at the  same  time 
reduce  the  profits  of  a  rival,  even  though  the  latter  receives 
some  useful  information of  the  former  firm  that  may. also  allow it, 
to  some  limited extent,  to  say  reduce  cost  or  improve  quality.  The 
strategic  investment  activities  then  inflict  negative 
externalities  on  the  rival  even  though  a  positive  transfer  of 
information occurs  (De  Bondt  and Veugelers  (1991)). 
The  intention  here  is  to  focus  mainly  on  business  strategies 
related to  so  called innovative activities  and  to  avoid  confusion, 
spillovers  will  here  be  equivalent  to  knowledge  spillovers: 
involuntary  leakage  or  voluntary  exchange  of  useful  technological 
information. 
2.1.  Innovative activities 
Technological  change,  innovative  and  knowledge  creation activities Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  4 
are  complex  phenomena  and  it is  therefore  useful  to  first  sketch 
some  major  categories  of  interest here. 
One  stylized view  is  that  technological  change  takes  place  as 
a  succession  of  incremental  changes,  with  occasional  major  shifts 
and  discontinuities.  Discontinuities  are  relatively  rare  and  may 
both  destroy  or  enhance  the  competence  of  existing  firms  in  the 
industry  (Tushman  and  Anderson  (1986)).  "Competence  destroying 
discontinuities"  require  fundamentally  new  skills,  abilities  and 
knowledge.  (e.g.  plain  paper  copying,  transistors  instead  of 
vacuum  tubes,  compact  disks  instead  of  records;  mechanical  ice 
instead  of  shipped  natural  ice,  catalytical  instead  of  thermal 
cracking,  float-glass  process  in  glass  manufacturing  substituted 
continuous  grinding  and  polishing).  They  are  very  exceptional  and 
unconstrained  new  entrants  often  play  a  major  role.  "Competence 
enhancing  discontinuities"  are  drastic  as  well,  but  more  frequent 
and  since  they  build  on  existing  know  how  within  a  product  class, 
existing successful  firms  often playa major  role  (e.g.  electrical 
typewriters  replacing  mechanical  ones,  the  thin-walled  iron-
cylinder black engine,  the edison kiln  (cement  process)). 
All  discontinuities  may  change  the  industry  structure  in  a 
drastic  way,  e.g.  because  of  the  entry  (and  exit)  they  stimulate, 
while  they  are  surrounded  by  high  technological  and  market 
uncertainty.  Stochastic  racing  models  and  other  dynamic  settings 
capture  some  essential  elements  including  the  option  (potential) 
rivals have  to  stop searching and  to  influence  timing. 
But  most  industries  are  also  characterized by  long  periods  of 
"incremental  product  and  process  changes".  These  tend  to 
consolidate  and  improve  technologies  and  are  competence  enhancing. 
Even  the  appearance  of  drastic  new  inventions  that  eventually  may 
render  obsolete  a  technology,  may  in  the  meantime  often  help  the 
older  technology  to  realize  further  rents.  Many  of  the 
technologies  that  underlay  the  development  of  the  steamship,  for 
example,  actually  served  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  sailing Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  5 
ships  (in  1892,  70  years  after  the  steamships  began  moving  trade 
between  England  and  North  Sea  Ports,  British  shipyards  launched 
their  largest  tonnage  of  sailing  ships  ever  (Young  (1993)).  These 
and  other  incremental  changes  thus  typically  consolidate  and 
stretch  life  cycles  of  existing  technologies  and  do  not  stimulate 
drastic  changes  in  industry structure  (less  entry and exit because 
of  the  changes).  Symmetric  or  asymmetric  models  of  cost-reducing 
or  quality  enhancing  R&D  investments  can  be  expected  to  capture 
the  impact  of  the  market  and  technological  environment  on  these 
incremental  efforts.  Learning  by  doing,  diffusion  and  licensing 
models  are  of  likewise  importance,  but will not be  looked at here. 
2.2.  Technological  spillovers 
The  described  "innovative"  activities  clearly  offer  many 
opportunities  for  useful  transfers  to  other  existing  and 
potentially  new  market  participants.  The  importance  of  spillovers 
for  business  and  for  innovative activities  and  economic  growth  has 
recently  spurred  an  abundant  empirical  literature.  While  the 
evidence  points  to  the  importance  of  spillovers, 
important  differences  between  industries  (and 
it also  suggests 
countries)  and 
between  the  various  means  of  information  transmission.  Spillovers 
in  other  words  do  have  a  "structural"  component  as  well,  since 
intra-industry  spillovers  may  be  larger  in  industries  with  high 
technological  opportunities  and  with  similar  products  and 
fabrication  processes  (say  automobiles,  computers)  (see  also  Jaffe 
(1986)).  Consistent  with  this  observation  is  that  inter-industry 
spillovers  tend  to  be  smaller  than  intra-industry  spillovers 
(Bernstein  (1988)) 
Innovations  are  often 
technologies  to  other  areas 
activities  the  "entrepreneur" 
the  inventions  for  the  first 
accompanied  by  export  of  the 
and  applications  and  in  those 
is  essential.  While  not  introducing 
time,  they  find  for  example  new 
geographic  locations  where  inventions  of  others  can  be  introduced Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  6 
profitably,  and  take  the  risk  of  adapting  the  exported  techniques 
to  the  geographic  and  market  conditions  in  the  new  locations 
(Baumol  (1993)).  The  focus  here  is  not  on  these  "entrepreneurial" 
technology  transfer  activities,  but  rather  on  more  or  less 
"routinized"  information  transfers  that  also  allow  technology  to 
travel with dramatic  rapidity. 
A  widely  cited study  by  Mansfield  (1985)  on  the  basis  of  100 
American  manufacturing  firms  reports  that  "information  concerning 
development  decisions  is  generally  in  the  hands  of  rivals  within 
12  to  18  months,  on  the  average,  and  information  containing  the 
detailed  nature  of  a  new  product  or  process  generally  leaks  out 
within  about  a  year".  They  also  found  relevant  product  information 
to  typically  leak  out  more  quickly  than  process  information. 
Levin,  Klevorick,  Nelson  and  Winter  (1987)  also  looked at  the  cost 
and  time  required  for  imitation and  reached  similar conclusions  as 
to  the  easiness  of  information transfers. 
The  new  information has  a  tendency to  become  known,  whether  or 
not  the  creator  wants  to  prevent  it  (Arrow  (1962))  and  the 
channels  and  mechanisms  of  information  transfer  are  numerous.  They 
include  licensing  technology,  patent  disclosures,  publications  or 
technical  meetings,  conversations  with  employees  of  innovating 
firms,  possibly  in  the  context  of  informal  networks,  hiring  of 
employees  of  the  innovator,  reverse  engineering  (Mansfield 
(1985)). 
Of  interest is  that  also  independent  R&D  is  seen  by  companies 
as  an  important  (sometimes  the  most  important)  channel  of 
spillovers  (e.g.  Harabi  (1995)).  Such  investments,  among  others, 
enhance  the  capabilities  for  learning  about  and  monitoring  of  the 
latest  technological  trends  in  the  market  and  generate  more  useful 
knowledge  to  be  traded if so  desired  (Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989)). 
In addition  they  make  it more  likely that  research  and  development 
activities  can  follow  uncorrelated  routes  and  hence  that  they  are 
complementary.  One  camera  manufacturer,  for  example,  may  figure Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  7 
out  an  improved  automatic  focus  device,  another  an  automatic  light 
adjustment,  and  a  third  may  invent  a  way  to  make  the  camera 
lighter and  more  compact.  These  divergent  research  findings  create 
of  useful  information,  that  quickly  and  ample  room  for 
cheaply  can  be 
exchange 
incorporated  in  so  far  that  existing  products  and 
production technologies  are not  too  far apart. 
Research  at  universities  serves  as  a  complement  for  company 
R&D,  for  technologies  related  to  computers,  metallurgy,  materials, 
chemistry  and  biology  (Nelson  (1986)).  Clearly  such  research  and 
interpersonal  contacts  in  technical  and  scientific  societies  and 
networks,  further  serves  as  a  channel  of  technological  and 
scientific spillovers. 
Firms  often  take  a  lot  of  effort  to  arrange  deliberate 
mechanisms  of  spillovers.  Baumol  (1993)  notes,  for  example:  "In 
some  cases  the  arrangement  is  totally  informal,  each  firm  simply 
expecting  full  access  to  the  innovations  of  the  horizontal  rival, 
with  full  provision  of  its  own  technological  advances  serving  as 
the  quid  pro  quo.  And  often,  even  where  exchange  is  ex-post  and 
involves  cross  licensing  of  specified  patents  from  each  firm  to 
the  other,  the  licence  fee  is  set  at  zero".  Also  in  ex  ante 
exchanges  in  the  framework  of  a  research  joint  venture,  the 
parties  may  not  know  in  advance  what  they  will  get  from  the 
transaction  since  the  contract  gives  access  to  innovations  that 
will only emerge  in the  future. 
Spillovers  result  from  transfer  and  exchange  of  information, 
but  they only refer  to  the  useful part  of  the  information  that has 
been  exchanged.  Two  firms  may  supply  each  other all  information  on 
whatever  innovative  activities  they  have  been  doing,  and still the 
spillover  may  be  small,  for  example,  because  their  existing 
technologies  or  products  are  so  different,  or  because  of 
organizational  resistance.  It  is  important  to  stress  that  the 
useful  employment  of  spillover  information  In  itself  is  a  real 
challenge  for  the  management  of  innovation.  In  the  pharmaceutical Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  8 
industry,  for  example,  companies 
of  knowledge  generated  in  all 
significantly  more  productive 
that  are  able  to  take  advantage 
areas  of  the  organization  are 
than  their  rivals  (Henderson 
(1994) ) .  High  tech  firms  need  the  brightest  people  in  core 
technologies,  but  they also  have  to  work  together.  Even  though  new 
technologies  (fax,  e-mail)  now  facilitate  new  transfer  of 
information,  effective  communication  does  not  always  corne  easy. 
Sometimes,  say  when  a  manufacturing  innovation  causes  a  yield 
breakthrough  in  production  of  memory  chips,  and  when  developed  in 
one  location,  it  may  be  adapted  very  quickly  by  other 
manufacturing  lines.  But  information  and  learning  in  general  does 
not  corne  free,  because  of  specialization  and  psychological  and 
other  barriers.  One  high-tech  company  started  a  "not  invented 
here"  award,  giving  recognition  to  people  who  adopt  an  idea  from 
elsewhere  in  the  company  (Taylor  (1990)).  To  develop  a  sustainable 
advantage 
structures 
may  require  the 
(e.g.  pooling 
use  of  adequate  knowledge  management 
knowledge  in  semi-permanent  project 
teams,  more  space  in offices  so  that  learning  by  walking  around  is 
stimulated,  generalist  training,  rotation,  incentive  structures), 
or  more  generally,  a  "learning  organization",  that  is  "an 
organization  skilled  at  creating,  acquiring,  and  transferring 
knowledge,  and  at  modifying  its  behavior  to  reflect  new  knowledge 
and  insights"(Garvin  (1983)) 
3.  Cooperation with  symmetric  spillovers 
Firms'  operations  in an  international  context  are  characterized by 
an  enlargement  of  the  competitive  environment,  stimulated  by  the 
convergence  in  consumption  patterns  and  by  the  technological 
evolutions  that  have  created  opportunities  to  sell  or  produce 
goods  on  a  worldwide  scale.  The  fastening  technological 
development  has  led  to  a  substantial  shortening  of  the  life cycle 
of  most  products,  which  implies  that  development  costs  have  to  be , 
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recovered  in  a  short  time  period.  before it becomes  profitable  for 
firms  to  introduce  new  products  or  processes.  This  requires 
immediate  sales  on  world  markets.  where  the  magnitude  of  these 
sales  lS  obviously  influenced  by  the  actions  of  international 
rivals.  Facing  this  process  of  globalisation.  firms  develop 
complex strategies.  depending  on their technological potential. 
In  order  to  reduce  the  high  and  risky  outlays  for  the 
development  and  sale  of  products  on  world  markets.  firms  have  the 
option  to  engage  in  cooperative  agreements  in  the  same  industry. 
or  with  independent  entities.  such  as  research  institutions  or 
firms  in  other  industries.  The  encouragement  or  tolerance  by 
governments  is  a  fact  or  subject  of  policy  debate  (e.g.  Jacquemin 
and  Soete  (1994)).  Such  cooperation. can  take  divergent  forms. 
ranging  from  strategic  cooperation  or  alliances  without  cross-
participations.  across  joint ventures  towards  full  cooperation  and 
mergers.  They  can  also  encompass  different  functional  activities. 
such  as  R&D.  marketing.  production  of  components.  or  information 
systems. 
In  the  theoretical  literature  on  R&D  cooperation.  not  so  much 
attention  has  been  devoted  to  specific  institutional  and 
organizational  aspects  of  R&D  cooperation.  "Non-cooperative 
conduct"  of  firms  refers  to  a  situation with  competition  (Nash)  in 
R&D  and  in  product  market.  "Cooperation"  usually  refers  to 
cooperation  in  R&D  and  comp~tition in the  market.  Full  cooperation 
refers  to  cooperation  in  all  considered  dimensions.  but  will  not 
be  10bked at  here.  One  central  theme  hereby  is  how  differences  in 
conduct  may  affect efforts and  innovative  output. 
One  of  the  earliest  analytical  treatments  of  spillovers  in 
oligopoly  can  be  found  in  a  paper  by  Ruff  (1969) 1.  He  analyzed  a 
stylized  growth  model  with  Cournot  firms  deciding  in  traditional 
and  modern  sectors  on  labor  inputs.  while  in  the  latter  they  can 
also  increase  the  productivity  by  employing  research  workers.  The Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  10 
firms  recognize  a  potential  "transmission"  of  knowledge  from  other 
firms,  so  that effective research effort per  firm  Xi  equals 
(1) 
with  Xi  own  efforts  (research  personnel),  n-1  number  of  rival 
firms,  that  all  have  Xj  as  effort  and  ~  a  spillover  parameter, 
Research  efforts  organized  in  a  cooperative  research 
laboratory  with  perfect  transmission  of  knowledge  and  equal 
sharing  of  cost,  while  preserving  Nash  behavior  in  labor  markets, 
result  in  a  more  progressive  economy  than  with  non-cooperative 
commitment  equilibrium  (open  loop)  in  research  efforts.  He  also 
found  some  support  for  the  Schumpeterian  hypothesis,  contending 
that  fewer  firms  with  a  resulting  higher  dynamic  efficiency  more 
than compensate static allocative inefficiencies. 
In  many  ways  recent  work  has  been  less  ambitious  than  this 
historic  preview.  On  the  other  hand  many  of  the  essential 
implications  only were  clarified recently.  One  central  (and  by  now 
well  known)  result  is  that  a  critical  spillover  "drives"  the 
comparison  of  non-cooperative  and  cooperative  efforts.  Some 
comments  on  the  robustness  and  limitations  of  this  inference  are 
developed below. 
3.1.  Racing  games 
The  game  theoretic  racing  games  developed  in  the  eighties  provided 
a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  impact  of  conduct  and  spillovers 
on  innovative  efforts.  Spillovers  during  the  racing  (Reinganum 
(1981))  and after the racing were  looked at  (Stewart  (1983)). 
In  Reinganum's  (1981)  differential  game  analysis,  rivals  are 
competing  for  an  invention  that  will  give  a  higher  (not  lower) 
payoff  to  the  winner  of  the  stochastic  race  than  to  imitators. 
Each  firm  accumulates  knowledge  relevant  to  the  innovation  Zi'  by 
investing  in  research  and  possibly by  assimilating  spillovers  from Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  11 
rival's  investments.  The  effective  research effort at  any  time  now 
equals  the rate of  knowledge  accumulation,  or in case of  duopoly: 
(2 ) 
The  probability  of  successful  innovation  by  a  future  date 
increases  as  the  accumulated  stock  of  knowledge  at  that  time  is 
greater  In  an  exponential  like  fashion.  The  cost  of  research 
investments  are  l.x 2  2  i  so  that  firms  operate  with  diminishing 
returns. 
The  memoryless  nature of  the conditional  success probabilities 
makes  that  commitment  (open  loop)  and  strategic  (feedback) 
investments  coincide,  which  highlights  in  some  sense  the  special 
perhaps  "static"  character  of  the  stochastic  specification  used. 
In  a  duopoly  with  winner  takes  all  and  symmetric  equilibria,  it 
can be  proved that: 
with  no  spillovers  in  racing  i.e.,  ~=O,  Nash  rivals  could  be 
expected  to  innovate  at  an  earlier  date  than  cooperative 
firms,  since they invest  a  higher rate at each instant in time 
than  the  cooperative  rivals;  but  with  perfect  spillovers, 
i.e.~=l,  one  obtains  the opposite  tendencies.  (3 ) 
In  many  instances  the  innovator  will  (have  to)  share  the 
market  with  imitators.  Stewart  (1983)  was  the  first  to  analyse  the 
impact  of  post-racing  market- sharing  spillovers  on  constant 
efforts  in  a  stochastic  (exponential)  racing  model.  The  innovator 
gets  0'  of  the  present  value  of  the  innovation  while  each  losing 
firm  obtains  (1-0')/(n-1)  Winner  takes  all  corresponds  to  no 
market-sharing  spillovers  or  0'=1  and  perfect  spillovers  result  in 
a  symmetric  sharing of  the  innovative prize,  or O'=l/n. 
It  seems  like  she  was  (one  of)  the  first  to  explicitly  note 
the  role of  a  critical spillover level  0'* Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  12 
lin <  a*  :::;  1  (4) 
so  that  a*  represents  an  "intermediate"  level  of  the  market 
spillover.  She  showed  that: 
for  small  spillovers  non-cooperative  symmetric  efforts  are 
larger  than  cooperative  racing  efforts  (a>a*);  for  large 
spillovers  the  opposite  occurs  (a<a*);  and  there  exist  an 
intermediate level of  spillovers  for  which  the non-cooperative 
and cooperative efforts coincide  (a=a*)  (5) 
This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  earlier  result  (3)  that 
applies  to  efforts  changing  through  time,  and  only  compares 
extreme  values  of  the  spillovers  during  the  race.  Stewart  gave  no 
explanation  for  the  role  of  the  critical spillover.  But  the  impact 
of  conduct  on  innovative  efforts  can  easily  be  explained  by  the 
externalities  that  they  impose  on  the  rival's  expected  profits. 
One  can  indeed verify: 
A  larger  effort  of  a  Nash  rival  results  in  a  decrease  in 
expected  profit  of  a  rival  if  spillovers  are  small  (<J>a*). 
Cooperation  that  internalizes  this  negative  externality 
results  in  a  smaller  racing  effort.  For  large  spillovers  the 
opposite  occurs,  a  positive  externality  is  internalized 
through  cooperation  and  a  larger  effort  results  (<J<a*).  For 
the  intermediate  value  of  market  spillovers  there  are  no 
externalities  and  efforts  coincide  in  cooperation  and  rivalry 
(a  =  a*) .  (6) 
The  same  interpretation also  drives  investment  levels  in  two  stage 
strategic settings  (see  below),  as  was  first noted  by  De  Bondt  and 
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Finally  it  may  be  noted  that  there  are  related  "stochastic" 
models  that  abstract  from  timing,  but  have  firms  simultaneously 
committing  to  a  choice  of  probability  of  success,  with  a  higher 
probability  implying  higher  costs  (with  diminishing  returns)  and 
abstracting  from  ex  post  rivalry  and  interactions  (e.g.  Stenbacka 
and  Tornbak  (1995),  Choi  (1993))  They  report  among  others,  similar 
tendencies  as  reported  in  this  section,  including  the  role  of  a 
critical spillover. 
3.2.  Commitment  games 
Innovative  investments  also  have  been  analyzed  in  more  simple 
settings  where  in essence  oligopoly  firms  decide  simultaneously  on 
a  certain level  of  say product  improvement  (or  on  advertising)  and 
on production or price levels  . 
An  improvement  of  a  personal  computer  may  result  in  an 
improved  competitive  position,  i.  e.  a  market  share  effect  at  the 
expense  of  the  rival.  At  the  same  time  this  may  also  attract  new 
users  in  the  market,  i.e.  a  market  expansion  effect  may  occur, 
that  may  also  benefit  other  firms.  A  clever  advertising  campaign 
for  a  brand  may  likewise  result  in  an  improved  market  share  and 
may  simultaneously  draw  the  attention  of  reluctant  consumers  to 
these  new  products.  Such  a  market  expansion  effect  may  benefit 
rivals  as  well,  especially  for  goods  and  services  in  the beginning 
of  the  life cycle.  Sometimes  market  expansion effects  are  small  or 
absent. 3 
Spillovers  that  result  from  market  expansion  effects  of 
advertising or quality  improvements  were  analyzed  in  the  beginning 
of  the  eighties.  Nakao  (1982)  looks  at  the  Nash  commitments  to  R&D 
expenditures  (open  loop)  in  an  oligopoly  where  firms  only  compete 
on  quality,  and  where  prices  are  set  at  a  common  cooperative 
level.  The  demand  of  any  firm  is  dependent  on  the  quality  levels 
of  all  rivals  and  those  are  determined  by  their  stock  of 
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depreciates  because  of  patent  termination  or  obsolence,  possibly 
because  of  new  rivalry.  Within  the  model,  technological  spillovers 
occur  only  on  the  demand  side.  Friedman  (1983)  analyses  in  a 
subsequent  paper  similar  effects  with  advertising  spillovers 
working  through  linear  demand  and  quadratic  cost  of  efforts.  More 
recent  treatments  looking  at  static  settings  with  both  demand  and 
cost  reducing  spillovers  and  Nash  commitments  include  Levin  and 
Reiss  (1988),  and  Cohen  and Levinthal  (1989). 
Many  results  of  these  dynamic  analyses  pertain  to  the  steady 
state and  some  details  on  underlying  tendencies  can  be  obtained by 
looking,  as  Nakao  (1982)  does  too,  at  a  market  attraction 
specification  that  incorporates  both  market  rivalry  and  market 
expansion effects.  The  quality enhancing efforts  Xi  of  oligopolists 
determine  firm  demand  qi  as  follows: 
f  (p) .Ai  (7 ) 
TotaVmarket  demand  equals  Lqi=  f (p) . (Lx,)"  with  f (.)  being  a 
decreasing  function  of 
(1976))4.  The  first 
the  common 
factor  of 
industry  price  p  (Schmalensee 
the  attraction  parameter  Ai 
represents  the  impact  of  the  R&D  investments  on  market  share  (with 
symmetric  efforts,  11.  (1-1/n)  is  the  elasticity  of  market  share 
with  respect  to  own  investments).  The  second  factor  reflects 
market  expansion  effects  (with  symmetry,  a  is  the  elasticity  of 
market  demand  with  respect  to  total  industry efforts).  Efforts  and 
price are chosen simultaneously and  committed to. 
It can  be  shown  that with  symmetric  investments  the  impact  of 
an  investment  on  rival  demand  and  on  rival  profits  is  driven  by 
the magnitude  of  (a-1l)5: 
large  spillovers  are  reflected  in  (a-ll)  >  0,  while  small 
spillovers  correspond  to  (a-ll)  <  0;  an  intermediate  critical 
level  of  spillovers is obtained for  a=ll.  (8 ) Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  15 
For  example,  0;=0  means  that  investments  provide  no  market 
expansion  and  only  shift  market  shares.  An  increase  in efforts  by 
a  firm  then  inflicts  a  negative  externality  on  rival  demand  and 
profits.  For  a  positive  0;  and  ~=O  there  are  only  market  expansion 
effects  and  quality  investments  inflict  a  positive  externality  on 
rival  demand  and profits. 
Kesteloot  and  De  Bondt  (1993)  show  that  symmetric  Nash  efforts 
are  smaller  or  larger  than  cooperative  efforts  depending  on 
whether  spillovers  are  small  or  large  as  defined  above.  They  are 
again  equal  for  the  intermediate  level with  o;=~.  In addition it is 
possible  to  look at  the  ratio  of  firm's  investment  expenditures  to 
sales or the  R&D  intensity: 
With  small  spillovers  the  R&D  intensity  is  smaller  with  Nash 
rivalry  than  with  cooperation  (a-~) <0.  For  large  spillovers 
(o;-~)  >0  the  opposite  result  occurs.  For  intermediate 
spillovers  the  intensities  are  equal  with  both  conduct  forms 
(O;=~)  (9) 
Similar. effects  were  detected  by  Motta  (1992)  in  a  vertical 
product  differentiation  model  ip  which  R&D  expenditures  with 
spillovers  determine  quality/price  choices.  For  a  demand  structure 
in  which  total  expenditure  by  consumers  is  fixed,  there  are  no 
market  expansion  effects  (like  0;=0)  and  there  is  only  a 
competitive  effect.  He  finds  that  Nash  rivalry  will  result  in  a 
higher  effort  than  with  cooperation,  that  would  cut  back  on  the 
negative  competitive  leakages.  Other  technology  spillovers  play  no 
role  in  this.  In  case  quality  improvements  also  allow  for  market 
expansion,  technological  spillovers  help  to  achieve  this,  and  the 
usual  type  of critical spillover result  ((6), (8))  obtains. 6 Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  16 
3.3.  Strategic  investment  games 
The  models  above  essentially 
between  the  innovative  and 
ignore  the  strategic  interactions 
the 
Spencer  (1984) ,  Spence  (1984) 
production  side. 





analysis  of  multiple  stage  strategic  investments  and  the  analysis 
of  spillovers.  d'Aspremont  and  Jacquemin  (1988)  presented  an 
influential  strategic  investment  analysis  in  duopoly.  Many 
subsequent  models  (e.g.  Kamien,  Muller  and  Zang  (1992),  De  Bondt, 
Slaets  and  Cassiman  (1992),  Vonortas  (1994),  Beath,  Katsoulacos 
and  Ulph  (1988)),  built  on  this  differ  in details,  but  the  common 
structure can be  sketched as  follows. 
Firms  compete  in the  product  market  in the  second  stage  (a  la 
Cournot  or  a  la  Bertrand)  while  in  a  first  stage  they  compete  on 
R&D  investment,  leading  to  cost  reductions  in  the  production 
process  (or  to  enhanced  demand).  R&D  may  either  be  process  or 
product  oriented.  Successful  process  R&D  will  result  in production 
cost  reductions:  a  given  product  can  be  fabricated  more 
efficiently.  Such  process  R&D  can  be  formalized  as  a  downward 
shift  in  unit  production  costs.  Product  R&D  results  in  the 
introduction  of  new  or  improved  products,  which  can  be  formalized 
as  an outward shift of the  demand curve. 
The  innovative rivalry is of  a  non-tournament  kind.  Thus  there 
are  many  different research paths  that  firms  can  follow  to  improve 
their  production  process,  so  that  whatever  research  path  a  firm 
follows,  an  equivalent  amount  of  R&D  spending  will  generate  an 
equivalent  reduction  in production  costs  or  enhancement  in  demand. 
Competitors  cannot  prevent  other  firms  from  getting  equivalent 
improvements  through spending equivalent amounts  on  R&D. 
Firms'  R&D  efforts  may  be  perfectly  or  imperfectly 
appropriable.  In  case  of  imperfect  appropriability,  part  of  a 
firm's  R&D  results  leaks  out  to  rival  firms,  resulting  In  cost 
reductions  or  product  improvements  for  these  rivals.  These 
spillovers  are  formalized  by  a  parameter  Pi'  with  O~Pi~l.  In most  of Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  17 
the  existing  research  spillovers  are  treated  as  identical  between 
all  firms  although  results  on  asymmetric  spillovers  are  also 
beginning  to appear  (see  below) . 
Cournot  rivalry in  the  second  stage  has  been  most  extensively 
studied.  For  zero  spillovers  non-cooperative  strategic  R&D  results 
in  higher  efforts  than  with  cooperation  on  R&D.  Non-cooperative 
strategic  R&D  levels will  typically  (not  always)  decrease with  the 
magnitude  of  the  spillovers,  while  the  cooperative  investments 
tend  to  increase with increases  in spillovers,  see Figure 1. 
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Figure  1:  Strategic  R&D  investment  x  as  a  function  of  symmetric 
spillover  ~.  (d=b=l) 
There  is  a  critical technological  spillover level  ~*  for  which 
they  coincide  and  this  spillover  plays  the  same  role  as  reported 
above  for  market  sharing  spillover.  Mutatis  mutandi,  results  (5) 
en  (6)  apply.  In  the  case  of  duopoly with  a  linear  demand  Pi=a-bqi-
dqi'  i*j,  O~d~b,  b>O  the critical level is 
d/2b  ~ 1/2  (10) 
with  homogeneous  goods  d=b  and  ~*=1/2,  and  in  a  differentiated 
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When  comparing  non-cooperative  and  cooperative  R&D  levels,  it 
is  also  interesting  to  look  at  different  spillover  levels  for 
groups  that  are  cooperating  and  those  that  are  competing  (Katz 
(1986),  De  Bandt,  Sleuwaegen  and  Veugelers  (1988),  Beath  a.o. 
(1988),  Kamien  a.o.  (1992)).  It  would  not  be  surprising  if 
voluntary  spillovers  (with  cooperation)  were  larger  than 
involuntary ones.  In Figure  1  it can  be  seen  that  cooperation with 
perfect  spillovers  ("research  joint  venture  cartel")  results  in 
the highest effort  (and cost reduction)  (Karnien  a.o.  (1992)7). 
3.4.  Model  specific variations 
In  reality  firms  can  decide  simultaneously  or  sequentially  on 
investment  and  output  levels  and  this  is  of  importance  for 
characterizing  the  strategies.  In  the  racing  and  quality 
commitment  models  referred  to  above,  this  does  not  matter.  But  in 
the  other  settings  it  does.  De  Bandt  and  Veugelers  (1991)  show 
that  strategic  behavior,  resulting 
simultaneous  Nash  strategies  in 
from  sequential  rather  than 
duopoly  a  la  d'  Aspremont-
Jacquemin,  leads  to  more  R&D  than  necessary  to  minimize  costs, 
depending  on  whether  the  spillover  level  is  larger  than  the 
critical  spillover  level  ~*.  This  coincides  with  the  level  that 
drives  the  comparison  with  cooperative  efforts,  but  it is  unclear 
whether  this  will  hold  with  general 
specifications  (Leahy  and Neary  (1995)). 
demand  and  spillover 
Theoretical discussions  sometimes  state the  comparison  between 
non-cooperative  and  cooperative  efforts  in  terms  of  slope  of 
reaction  functions.  In  strategic  investment  models  with  quadratic 
payoffs  the  best  response  of  a  firm's  R&D  to  another  rival's 
efforts  is  upward  sloping  when  spillovers  are  larger  than  the 
critical  level  (~*)  and  in that  case  the  investments  are  strategic 
complements  (Bulow,  Geneakoplos  and  Klemperer  (1985)).  For  lower 
spillovers  they  are  downward  sloping  and  efforts  are  strategic 
substitutes.  Using  the  elementary  analysis  (downward  sloping Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  19 
reaction  curves  in  output  and  upward  sloping  reaction  curves  in 
prices)  it  is  then  explained  that  for  small  spillovers  (downward 
sloping),  cooperation  will  result  in  smaller  efforts  and  with 
large spillovers  (upward  sloping)  in larger efforts. 
But  this  line  of  reasoning  clearly  is  not  robust  across 
various  models.  In  a  duopoly  racing  model  with  small  market 
spillovers,  the  best  response  of  one  rival vis  a vis  the  other  is 
upward  sloping.  Small  spillovers  (cr>cr*)  preserve  the  winner  takes 
all  character  of  the  game  and  rivals  increase  race  efforts  as  a 
response  to  increases  by  others.  Cooperation  will  temper  these 
racing  efforts.  The  opposite  occurs  with  large  market  sharing 
spillovers  (cr<cr*) .  Likewise  in  the  market  share  quality 
specification  and  say  duopoly,  reaction  curves  will  be  negatively 
sloped  both  for  large  and  small  spillovers  B.  All  of  this  would 
seem  to .tell that it is unlikely that  the  search  for  slopes  of  R&D 
reaction  curves  will  tell  anything  about  the  likely  impact  of 
cooperation  One  thing  that  does  stand  is  that  critical 
spillovers  appear  to  guide  the  magnitude  of  the  efforts  in  both 
scenarios  of  conduct. 
Finally  a  few  words  on  the  determinants  of  the  critical 
spillover level.  It seems  clear  that in more  general  settings  this 
level  will  depend  on  the  curvature  of  the  demand  function.  For 
example,  Simpson  and  Vonortas  (1994)  find  that  a  research 
consortium  operates  a  single  research  facility  and  disseminates 
all results  to  members,  who  mayor  may  not  be  able  to  use  all  the 
information.  This  strategic  investment  setting  is  slightly 
different  from  the  one  discussed  above,  and  they  detect  incentives 
toward  higher  cooperative  effort  with  a  strictly  concave  demand, 
regardless  of  spillovers.  With  linear  or  convex  demand  the  more 
usual prediction  (6)  applies. 
The  importance  of  demand  is  confirmed  by  the  inference  from 
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closer  to  zero  as  products  become  more  differentiated,  see  (10). 
This  means  that cooperative  R&D  can  be  expected  to  exceed  the  non-
cooperative  level  for  a  much  wider  range  of,  also  smaller, 
spillover  values.  The  negative  competitive  effects  of 
externalities are  less  likely to  apply if each rival  operates  in  a 
more  segmented  market.  Likewise  in  a  less  competitive  industry 
(because  of  fewer  rivals),  cooperative  racing  (as  in  (Stewart 
(1983»  will  result  in  enhanced  racing  efforts  for  a  wider  range 
of sufficiently large spillovers  9 
In  reality  firms  may  undertake  different  kinds  of  R&D 
activities,  for  example  generic  (or  more  basic)  research  with 
possible  spillovers  and  afterwards  development  (more 
idiosyncratic)  efforts  with 
that  this  complicates  the 
no  spillovers.  Vonortas  (1994)  shows 
comparison  of  non-cooperative  and 
cooperative  efforts.  For  small  spillovers  ~:::;~.  cooperation  reduces 
generic  and  development  efforts,  but  the  critical  level  ~*  for 
which  the  opposite  applies  now  exceeds  1/2,  be  it  only  slightly 
when  the  technological  opportunities  of  development  are  weak  and 
the  (linear)  demand  curve  is flat.  10 
Finally  it  may  be  that  not  all  firms  are  part  of  the 
cooperative  agreement.  For  example,  one  group  of  cooperating  firms 
competes  against  other  rivals  in  an  industry  with  symmetric 
spillovers  ~.  In  a  variant  of  the  cost-reducing  game  discussed 
above,  De  Bondt  and  Wu  (1995)  show  that  such  cooperation will  also 
result  in  higher  R&D  investments  for  the  cartel  than  for  the 
competitive  fringe,  for  oligopolies  with  large  spillovers  (~>1/2). 
But  this  enhanced  effort  will  also  occur  in  industries  in  which 
industry wide  symmetric  spillovers  ~  are  small,  provided  only  that 
cooperation  results  in  a  sufficient  amount  of  additional 
information sharing  E.  More  precisely for: 
E  ~  (1- 2.~)/(n-k+1)  ~<1/2  (11) Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  21 
with  k  cooperating  firms  that  realize  spillovers  £+~,  in an  n-firm 
industry.  Poyago-Theotoky  (1995)  confirms  this 
perfect  information sharing  (£=1-~) 
4.  Spillovers,  innovative efforts  and  implications 
As  Schumpeter 
competition  is 
(1943)  emphasized, 
incompatible  with 
free  entry 
innovation, 





imperfections  and  a  few  firms  may  be  conductive  to  innovation.  But 
at  the  same  time  the  threat  of  new  competition  serves  as  a 
powerful  spur  to  ·innovative  efforts  and  hence  market  protection 
cannot  be  too  strong  either.  This  raises  the  question  as  to  what 
form  of  market  structure  is  most  conductive  to  processes  of 
creative  destruction.  Empirical  and  theoretical  research  tended  to 
support  the  view  that  some  form  of  intermediate rivalry,  with  some 
barriers  to  imitation but  typically not  too  much,  appears  as  most 
appropriate.  The  early  game  theoretic  approaches  tended to  dismiss 
these  theoretical  insights  because  they  were  based  on  decision 
theoretic  analysis,  i.  e.  partial  equilibrium.  At  the  same  time 
racing  settings  typically  posited  perfect  patent  protection  and 
thus  did  not  analyze  the  impact  of  possible  spillovers  (but  see 
above) . 
This  is  important because  spillovers  a  priori have  conflicting 
effects  on  innovative  efforts.  This  potential  role  is  thus 
reminiscent  of  the  Schumpeterian  conflicting  effect  of 
"competition".  Spillovers  typically  temper  research  efforts,  since 
they  tend  to  limit  the  appropriability  of  individual  activities. 
On  the  other  hand,  spillovers  may  stimulate  technological  change 
since  information  transfers  may  allow  synergies  to  be  realized, 
duplication  to  be  eliminated  and  innovation  costs  to  be  reduced. 
This  raises  the  question  as  to  their  net  effect  and  to  the 
relevance  of  this  for  firms  and  society.  What  does  recent  analysis 
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4.1.  Spillovers  and  individual  R&D 
Symmetric  intra-industry spillovers  limit  the  appropriability of  a 
firm's  R&D  inves.tment,  but at  the  same  time  they allow it to  learn 
from  others.  The  net  effect  is  either  to  discourage  or  to 
stimulate  . 
4.1.1.  Disincentive effect 
The  typical  inference  is  that  spillovers  limit  the  efficiency  of 
the  R&D  investment  to  create  a  competitive  advantage  and  thus 
(Spence  (1984)  and many  others) : 
positive  and  symmetric  intra-industry  spillovers  tend  to 
reduce  the incentive for non-cooperative  investments  in R&D. 
(12) 
An  increase  in  the  number  of  oligopolists  in  a  cost-reducing  non-
cooperative  game  likewise  typically  tends  to  reduce  efforts  (De 
Bondt a.o.  (1992)). 
Market-sharing  spillovers  in 
disincentives.  Delbono  and  Denicolo 
racing  provide  similar 
(1990)  studied  a  stochastic 
race  at  the  end  of  which  a  technological  improvement  lowers  cost 
of  the  winner,  while  losers  continue  with  the  old  technology. 
"Market  sharing"  may  occur  even  though  knowledge  does  not  spill 
over  to  rivals.  Racing  firms  then  collect  a  ·profit  from  using  an 
old technology,  as  long as  racing continues".  They  show that: 
constant  racing  efforts  are  stimulated  by  the  difference  in 
profits  between  winning  and  losing,  i.e.  by  the  "competitive 
threat"  (Beath,  a.o.  (1988))  (a), 
and  by  the  difference  between  the  winner's  profits  and 
existing profits  ("profit  incentive"  =  incentive  to  invest  if 
there is no  rivalry)  (b)  (13 ) 
The  first  prediction  (a)  is  consistent  with  the  results  in 
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a  higher  one  for  the  imitator  reduces  the  Nash  research efforts  of 
any  of  the  racing  rivals.  They  also  show  that  Cournot  rivalry 
entails  reduced  racing efforts,  since  with post-innovation  Cournot 
"sharing",  the loser is better off than with Bertrand competition. 
Also  Stewart  (1983)  predicts  that  non-cooperative  efforts  will  be 
discouraged  by  increasing  market  spillovers  that  are  already 
small'2 •  Clearly all of  this  is  in  the  spirit of  the  disincentive 
prediction  (12). 
4.1.2.  Incentive effect 
But  casual  empiricism  and  econometric  work  also  suggest  that 
spillovers  may  fail  to  discourage,  but  instead  may  stimulate 
individual  efforts.  This  "reversed"  prediction has  emerged  in  the 
context  of  a  number  of  the  earlier models  that  look at  commitment, 
instead  of  strategic  choices.  The  intuitive  reason  is  that 
strategic  investment  efforts  have  a  competitive  and  a  market 
effect:  The  competitive  effect  of  cost  reduction  or  demand 
enhancement  is  countered  by  Nash  rivals  and  its  effectiveness 
diminishes  as  spillovers  increase,  hence  spillovers  result  in  a 
"competitive  leakage".  The  market  effect  is  that  because  of  the 
spillovers,  all industry members  operate  with  lower  cost  or  higher 
demand,  thus  larger  output,  and  this  should· stimulate  efforts, 
hence spillovers provide  a  "market  expansion effect". 
In  strategic  investment  models  the  competitive  leakage  effect 
tends  to  dominate  and  more  spillovers  typically  lower  effort, 
unless  other  factors  such  as  a  not  too  competitive  oligopoly  (high 
degree  of  product  differentiation,  small  number  of  rivals)  render 
the  leakage  effect  small  and  then  the  opposite  tendency  may  apply. 
In  commitment  settings  where  firms  choose  simultaneously  on 
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spillovers  enhance  non-cooperative  efforts  (e.g.  Friedman  (1983), 
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game,  for  example,  a  firm's  non-cooperative  (and  cooperative) 
efforts  increase  as  the  market  expansion  effect  ex  becomes  more 
important  (Kesteloot  and  De  Bondt(1993)). 
This  also  explains  why  many  of  these 
Reinganum  (1981),  Motta  (1992),  Vonortas  (1994)) 
papers  (including 
find that: 
cooperative  R&D  investments  are  typically stimulated by  larger 
spillovers  (14) 
see  Figure  1."3  It  is  also  consistent  with  the  finding  of  Steurs 
(1995)  that  inter-industry  spillovers  stimulate  R&D  investments, 
since  they  have  no  competitive  effects  for  rivals  that  operate  in 
different industries. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  commitment  rather  than 
strategic  investment  is  the better description of  reality.  But  the 
former  clearly can  not  be  excluded,  since  among  others  adjustment 
costs  tend  to  be  very  high,  while  information  to  calculate  or  to 
behave  as  if calculating the  subgame  perfect strategies  may  not  be 
present at the  time  of decision making.  14 
In  the  strategic  investment  duopoly  analyzed  by  De  Bondt  and 
Henriques  (1995)  it also  turns  out  that  asymmetries  in  spillovers 
may  change  the  disincentive  effect,  even  when  homogeneous  products 
provide  little  room  for  a  limitation  of  competitive  leakage.  If 
one  firm  is  better  at  learning  (receives  more  spillovers  than 
the  rival,  it  may  well  be  stimulated  by  an  increase  of  not  too 
large spillovers. 
Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989)  likewise  argue  that  learning  costs 
are  substantial  in  the  long  run.  R&D  investments  not  only  lead  to 
innovations,  but  also  increase  the  capacity  of  firms  to  absorb 
know  how.  This  determines  the  extent  to  which  firms  are  actually 
able  to  use  the  spillovers  and  hence  the matter  may  also  stimulate 
innovative activities. 
Levin  and  Reiss  (1988)  distinguish  the  extent  of  spillovers 
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spillover  effect.  If  the  spillover  productivity  increases,  the 
total  spillover  increases,  but  this  will  not,  as  the  proposition 
states,  decrease  R&D  investment.  Instead  R&D  investment  will  be 
increased  because  own  R&D  lS  enhanced  by  increases  in  industry 
knowledge. 
The  commitment  nature  of  R&D  flow  expenditures  in racing  games 
also  results  in  an  increase  In  efforts  as  the  number  of  racing 
contenders  increaselS •  The  plan is to  stop  these  outlays  as  soon  as 
the  innovation  appears:  both  expected  revenue  and  expected  costs 
are  reduced  by  more  rivals  and  the  effect  is  to  stimulate 
individual  efforts  (Lee  and  Wilde  (1980),  Reinganum  (1984)). 
Delbono  and  Denicolo  (1991)  combine  such  a  race  by  Cournot  rivals 
to  obtain  drastic  or  non-drastic  improvements  in  profitability. 
Drastic  innovations  effectively  eliminate  all  rivals  and  give  the 
winner  a  monopoly  power.  Equilibrium  efforts  to  obtain  such  a 
price  are  stimulated  by  the  number  of  rivals.  But  this  prediction 
does  not  appear  for  non-drastic  improvements  that  say  lower  only 
moderately  the  costs  of  the  winner;  with  linear  demand  and  a 
specific  hazard  rate  function  specification,  individual  efforts 
may  be  stimulated by  more  rivals  in cases  with  sufficiently likely 
discovery  (or high discount  rate)  16. 
4.2.  Spillovers  and  knowledge  level 
It  should  be  clear  that  symmetric 
efficient  use  of  scarce  R&D  resources. 
spillovers  allow  a  more 
In  the  analyzed  context  it 
can  be  expected  that  the  total  amount  of  cost  reduction,  per 
dollar  spent  on  R&D,  increases  as  the  spillover  augments.  Larger 
spillovers  In  other  words  enhance  a  higher  innovative 
productivity,  since  among  others  they  allow  duplication  to  be 
eliminated. 
But  of  course  the  firm  nor  society  is  interested  in 
productivity  per  se.  And  it  turns  out  that  l.n  a  number  of 
symmetric  settings  it  lS  not  this  productivity  but  rather  the Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  26 
knowledge  level  created  In  each  firm,  that  is  driving  the 
individual  and general  performance. 
The  individual  knowledge  level  or  effective  R&D  that  results 
from  innovative  activities  in  an  industry  equals  in  a  cost-
reducing  game  the  actual  reduction  in  the  unit  cost  of  production. 
With  symmetric  spillovers  and  investments,  and  with  n  firms  it is 
X=x+x. (n-1)  .~  and  the  essence  of  this  concept  can  already be  found 
in pioneering contributions.  So  with perfect appropriability  (~=O), 
R&D  investment  and  effective  R&D  coincide.  But  with  the  existence 
of  spillovers,  the  effective  R&D  of  the  individual  firm  is 
determined  by  its  R&D  investment  increased  with  the  part  of  the 
investment  of  other  firms  in the  industry  that spills  over  to  that 
firm. 
In  the  generalized  d'Aspremont-Jacquemin  model  analyzed  by  De 
Bandt  a.o. (1992),  with  strategic  cost-reducing  R&D  in  an  n-firm 
duopoly  the critical spillover  ~*  level has  an  analogous  effect for 
the  comparison  between  non-cooperative  and  cooperative  effective 
R&D: 
For  small  spillovers  (~<~*)  the effective  R&D  with cooperation 
is  smaller  than  with  non-cooperative  efforts.  For  large 
spillovers  ~>~*  the  opposite  applies,  while  equality  obtains 
(15) 
This  result  is  of  course  driven  by  the  comparison  of  the  R&D 
efforts.  In  case  conduct  also  changes  the  spillovers,  a  similar 
picture emerges  as  in Figure  1. 
For  example,  when  cooperation  results  in  perfect  spillovers, 
effective  R&D  is  larger  than with  Nash  efforts  without  spillovers. 
This  result  has  been  confirmed  in  a  differential  game  setting 
(Reinganum  (1981) 
time  horizon.  In 
provided  firms 
the  beginning 
are  sufficiently  near  the  given 
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cooperative  rate .of  knowledge  accumulation  with  perfect  spillovers 
is  typically  lower  than  would  be  the  case  with  Nash  and  no 
spillovers. 
A  systematic  analysis  of  the  impact  of  spillovers  on effective 
R&D  is quite  involved but  De  Bondt,  a.o.  (1992)  argue  17 
Effective  non-cooperative  strategic  R&D  will  be  maximized  for 
an  intermediate spillover  ~e with 1/2  ~ W  ~ 1  (~*  =  ~e  =  1/2  in 
the  homogeneous  goods  case  and  1/2  <  ~e  ~ 1  for  differentiated 
products),  see  Figure  2.  (16) 
The  intuition  for  this  result  is  simple.  Individual  strategic  R&D 
is  typically  discouraged  in  an  increasing  way  through  the 
existence  of  spillovers.  with  a  large  number  of  firms,  an 
increasing  portion  of  R&D  efforts  of  competitors  compensates  for 
the  reduction  in  own  R&D  investment.  Of  course  investments  of 
competitors 
that  first 
individually  also  decrease. 
effective  R&D  increases  and 
spillover is reached,  it starts to fall. 
The  resul  ting 
then,  when 
effect  is 
a  critical 
It  can  be  shown  that  in  differentiated  oligopolies·  the 
critical spillover  ~e  for  which  effective  R&D  is maximized  tends  to 
increase  as  the  structure  of  the  industry  becomes  less  competitive 
(more  product  differentiation  and  a  smaller  number  of  rivals).  In 
a  duopoly  with  high  product  differentiation,  effective  R&D  would 
be  higher  with perfect  than without  spillovers.  This  is  consistent 
with  Reinganum's  (1981)  result  that perfect  spillovers  in  a  winner 
takes  all  differential  game  may  also  result  in  an  earlier  non-
cooperative  introduction, 
among  competing rivals. 
than  if  knowledge  were  pure  private 
Steurs  (1995)  has  shown  ln  a  related setting that  the critical 
spillover  level  tends  to  decrease  as  the  inter-industry 
spillovers  <I>  increase.  As  an  example  of  the  latter,  one  may 
consider  better  and  cheaper  ways  to  produce  plastic  elements ° 
° 
° 
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Figure  2  :  Strategic  investment  x  and effective  R&D  X  as  a  fuction 
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developed  in  the  petrochemical  industry,  that  could  to  some  extent 
be  used  in  the  computer  industry to  design  components  and  assembly 
of  products,  that  allow  cheaper  production.  Symmetric  inter-
industry  spillovers  tend  to  enhance  the  disincentive  effect  of 
intra-industry  spillovers, 
competitive  leakage  effects. 
slnce  they  tend 
In  fact  effective 
to  increase  the 
R&D  may  decrease 
with  intra-spillovers  ~,  if  inter-industry  communication  ~  is 
sufficiently  large  [~>(l-(l/n)L  which  becomes  more  unlikely  as 
more  rivals  compete  in strategic investments. 
The  result  is  of  significance  since  in  the  same  setting  the 
firm  output,  consumer  surplus  and  firm  profits  gross  of  R&D 
expenditures  are  also  maximized  at  ~e.  Typically,  some  but  not  too 
much  appropriability  appears  to  be  the  most  conductive  for 
innovative  output.  A  similar  prediction  emerged  from  decision 
theoretic  analysis,  in  which  some  but  not  too  high  barriers  to 
imitation,  limiting  entry  or  preemption,  were  found  to  be  most 
conductive  to  innovative activity in  a  wide  class  of  circumstances 
(Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1976),  De  Bondt  (1977)). 
4.3.  Spillovers,  profits and static welfare 
Stewart  (1983)  found  in  a  technology  race  model  that  expected 
profits  are  maximized  at  the  critical  market  sharing  value  cr*.  In 
non-cooperative  oligopolies,  with  products  not  too  differentiated 
and  rivals  sufficiently  numerous,  individual  profits  and  also 
static  welfare  will  first  increase  and  then  decrease  with  the 
level  of  symmetric  spillovers  18  In  less  competitive  structures 
spillovers  tend  to  stimulate  both profits  and welfare.  This  result 
lS  driven  by  the  effect  of  spillovers  on  the  created  knowledge 
level  (effective  R&D)  . 
In  addition it is  typically  so  that  industry  wide  cooperation 
improves  on  profitability and  on  static welfare  too,  if spillovers 
are  large  enough".  The  full  implications  cannot  be  drawn  without Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  30 
an  additional  stage  that  endogenizes  the  spillovers  (see  e.g.  Katz 
(1986)).  With  homogeneous  settings  and  spillovers  equal  to  the 
critical  level  of  1/2,  firms  would  maximize  individual profits  and 
could  not  improve  on  this,  at  that  spillover,  by  cooperating  (in 
view  of  (6)  investments  and  profits  are  the  same  at  the  critical 
~*)  They  could  improve  on profits only if the cooperation succeeds 
in  improving  spillovers  and  then  static  welfare  would  also 
increase20  •  Steurs  (1995)  found  that  inter-industry cooperation  is 
likely to  improve  more  on  welfare  and  on profits if inter-industry 
spillovers  $  are  sufficiently  high  compared  to  inter-industry 
corrununication  ~  ($>2~-1).  Also  in this  case  the  private  incentives 
work  in the direction that  improves  on static welfare. 
5.  Asymmetric  spillovers 
Most  of  the  above  refers  to  syrrunetric  oligopoly  settings  and 
equilibria.  Even  in  syrrunetric  structures  there  may  be  asyrrunetric 
equilibria  and  In  a  number  of  reported  models  those  cannot  be 
excluded  for  some  of  the  parameter  values  21  Since  oligopolies  in 
reality seldom  are  syrrunetric,  for  historic,  stochastic  reasons  and 
strategic  choice, 
implications. 
it  is  of  interest  to  look  at  some  of  the 
5.1.  Research cartels 
A  first  complication  is  that  not  all  firms  may  be  part  of  the 
cooperative venture,  while  cooperation  in itself allows  to  improve 
on  information  sharing.  Poyago-Theotoky  (1995)  and  De  Bondt  and  Wu 
(1995)  among  others,  analyze  an  extension  of  the  strategic 
investment  game  in  which  k  firms  coordinate  R&D  investments  and 
play  Nash  in  R&D  against  the  n-k  remaining  rivals.  All  firms  play 
Cournot  in  the  second  stage.  Cooperating  firms  may  possibly 
increase  spillovers  by  0::::;£::::;1-~  for  all  participating  members.  The Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  31 
stability  of  the  coalition  size  k  (in  stable  configurations  no 
firm  wants  to  join  nor  leave  (d'Aspremont,  Jacquemin,  Gabszewicz 
and  Weymark  (1983))  is  very  sensitive  to  the  possibility  of  such 
an  increase.  In  case  this  is  not  possible,  stable  cartel  sizes 
tend  to  be  small.  Even  though  individual  profits  may  increase  for 
members  of  the  coalition  as  the  size  grows,  it  is  in  many  cases 
better  not  to  join  it or  to  leave  it.  It  may  be  better  to  free 
ride  on  the  cartel's  large  cooperative  investments  in  industries 
with  large  spillovers  or  to  take  advantage  of  its  low  R&D  efforts 
and  output  in situations with  low  spillovers  (a  la Salant,  Switzer 
and  Reynolds  (1983)).  But  with  better  information  sharing,  large 
and  industry  wide  coalition  sizes  tend  to  become  stable  for  wide 
ranges  of parameters. 
Consistent with this,  Kesteloot  and Veugelers  (1995)  find  that 
better  information 
incentive  of  firms 
sharing  in 
to  cheat 
a  symmetric  duopoly,  reduces  the 
on  the  agreed  upon  strategic 
investments,  in  essence  because  upon  detection  they  tend  to  lose 
the  benefits  of  this  additional  sharing  by  going  back  to  rivalry. 
The  cheating  incentives  tend  to  be  particularly high,  in ventures 
with  otherwise  high  spillovers  such  as  with  generic  research  (and 
low with  low spillovers as with development  R&D)  . 
Simulations  results of  the  R&D  cartel setting also suggest: 
In  a  wide  class  of  circumstances  (with  not  too  small  industry 
spillovers  and  additional  information  sharing  in  the  cartel), 
consumer  surplus  (and  static  welfare)  tend  to  increase' with 
the  size  of  the  R&D  cartel  in oligopolies  with  a  small  number 
of  firms.  Otherwise  they  first  increase  and  then  decrease  as 
membership  becomes  more  numerous,  see  Figure  3.  (17) 
There  is,  however,  a  conflict between  the size that maximizes  firm 
profits  and  the  one  that maximizes  consumer  surplus  and static 
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Figure  3  Static  welfare  (W)  as  a  function  of  the  size  k  of  an 
R&D  cartel in a  n  firm  industry.  (~= 0.6,  £=  0.3) 
Similar  tendencies  apply  for  the  level  of  the  industry  wide 
spillover, 
These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  Kamien  and  Zang  (1993) 
results  of  equally  sized  R&D  cartels  that  perfectly  share 
information  among  its  members  (£=1-~).  They  show  that  splitting  a 
single  R&D  cartel  into  several  symmetric  competing  ones  would 
yield  lower  prices.  And  a  split  in  half  would  be  best  for 
knowledge  creation and  low prices.  But  this  would  also  reduce  firm 
profits  and  the  impact  of  the  split  in half  on  static welfare  can 
go  either  way.  Combs  (1993)  considers  a  model  in  which  the 
probability  of  success  in  innovation  depends  on  the  sharing  of 
information.  She  argues,  however,  that  stable  coalition  sizes  can 
never  exceed  the size that maximizes  total surplus. 
The  above  results  suggest  again  that  in  many  cases  innovative 
activities  are  highest  in  industries  with  an  intermediate  degree 
of  rivalry  (coalition size,  or  industry spillovers  not  too  large). 
In  more  exceptional  circumstances  an  industry  wide  (grand)  cartel 
may  be  most  conductive  to  technological  change  (see also  above) . Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  33 
5.2.  Role  playing 
One  of  the  central  themes  In  1.0.  and  business  strategy  concerns 
the  question  whether  it  is  better  for  a  firm  to  innovate  or  to 
wait  and  imitate.  Incumbent  firms  often  appear  to  be  "slow"  to 
introduce  major  innovations,  that  in  many  cases  seem  to  be  coming 
from  new  entrants  (Jewkes,  Sawyers  and  Stillerman  (1958))  Only 
recently,  for  example,  Bower  and  Christensen  (1995)  claimed:  "One 
of  the  most  consisting  patterns  in  business  is  the  failure  of 
leading  companies  to  stay  at  the  top  of  their  industries  when 
technologies  and market  change". 
One  well  known  reason  for  this  tendency  is  the  incumbent's 
fear  of  cannibalization  or  the  "never  change  a  winning  team" 
disincentive.  Reinganum  (1983)  looked  at  a  stochastic  cost 
reducing  innovation  that  is  drastic  (winner  takes  the  whole 
market).  The  existence  of  a  challenger  firm  leads  an  incumbent 
firm  to  invest  more  than  it  otherwise  would. 
equilibrium  it 
because  it  has 
invests  less  than  the  challenger, 
an  incentive  not  to  terminate  the 
But  in  Nash 
essentially 
(stochastic) 
profit  flow  from  existing  products.  Challengers  invest  more  and 
are  more  likely  to  win  the  patent  race.  While  she  obtains  similar 
tendencies  with  non-drastic  innovations,  i.e.  with  some  market 
sharing,  the  result  is  less  clear  cut  (obtains  for  a  more  narrow 
set  of  parameter  values).  One  problem  with  the  cannibalization 
explanation  is  of  course  that  if  leadership  were  essential  for 
incumbents,  one  would  observe  them  figuring  out  a  way  to  counter 
this,  say  by  placing  responsibility  for  building  a  disruptive 
technology business  in an  independent organization. 
In  a  later  paper  Reinganum  (1985)  looked  at  sequential  moves 
In  development  activities  with  technological  uncertainty,  but 
without  spillovers.  First  movers  have  an  incentive  to  reduce 
efforts  to  force  rival  to  do  the  same.  As  a  result  first-movers 
are  less  likely  to  win  a  race  and  would,  instead,  prefer  to  be Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  34 
followers.  Baik  and  Shogren 
that  affect  the  likelihood 
(1992)  analyzed  the  strategic  efforts 
of  winning  a  contest.  The  underdog 
moves  first  and  underinvests  (relative  to  the  simultaneous  move 
efforts)  in  order  to  reduce  the  wrath  of  the  favorite  who  moves 
second.  And  a  final  interesting  contribution  is  provided  by  Rosen 
(1991)  who  argues  that  innovative  strategies  cannot  be  separated 
from  then  pre-innovative  technology  of  the  incumbent  or  entrant. 
Duopolists  cornrni t  simultaneously  to  ei  ther  a  safe  or  more  risky 
project  and  to  the  scale at which  they  intend  to  pursue  the  chosen 
project.  For  competence-enhancing  discontinuities  or  improvement 
innovations  (see  section two),  a  low-cost  firm  invests  more  and  in 
safer  projects  than  the  high-cost  duopolist.  Symmetric  spillovers 
are  argued  to  lead  firms  to  preferring  safer  projects23 •  The  low-
cost  rival  also  invests  more  in  add-on  projects  and  less  in 
revolutionary  (drastic)  innovations.  This 
equilibrium  analyzed  by  Rosenkranz  (1995) 
and  high  profit  firm  enters  earlier  than 
is  consistent  with  an 
in  which  a  high  quality 
the  low  quality  rival 
(given  that  willingness  to  pay  for  high  quality  is  sufficiently 
high) 24. 
De  Bondt  and  Henriques  (1995)  compare  sequential  with 
simultaneous  strategic  investments  in  a  cost-reducing  game  with 
asymmetric  spillovers.  They  find that,  see Figure  4: 
both  rivals  benefit  from  a  leader  announcing  its  investment 
first,  in  case  that  the  spillovers  that  the  leader  absorbs  ~ 
are  large  (>d/2b)  and  the  spillovers  the  follower  receives  ~F 
are  small  «d/2b)  (a) 
the  leader  invests  less  and  the  follower  invest more  than with 
a  simultaneous  announcement  and  this  will  typically  cause 
prices  to  increase  (b)  (18) Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  35 
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Figure  4:  Reaction  and  iso-profit  curves  with  asymmetric 
spillovers.  Leader  invests  Xl'  and  receives  perfect  spillover,  and 
follower  invests  x 2  and receives  zero spillover. 
Simulations  indicate  that  in  such  a  sequential  equilibrium  the 
efforts  of  the  leader will  increase  In case  his  initial cost  level 
is reduced compared to that of  the  follower. 
The  driving  force  of  result  (8)  however,  is  the  asymmetry  in 
the  spillovers  and  the  fact  that  the  leader  will  be  able  to 
"learn"  more.  One  can  think  of  writing  a  paper  that  does  not  milk 
the  issue  and  hence  followers  will  build  on  it.  This  will  result 
in  more  citations  to  the  innovating  paper  and  also  the  leader  is 
better off.  Scholars  that  are  likely to  be  cited more,  say because 
of  reputation,  will  as  a  consequence  lead  and  this  is  better  for 
everyone  than if one  attempted to  compete  head on. 
In  industries  one  likewise  often  observes  innovative  entrance 
on  a  smaller  scale with  aggressive  massive  imitation.  The  follower 
gives  way:  it is  better  than  trying  to  get  through  the  door  together 
(Schnaars  (1994)).  The  leader  knows  it  may  benefit  from  the  late 
massive  entry  of  the  follower,  that  will  help  say  to  open  up  the 
market.  And  as  a  consequence  it  invests  less  and  the  follower 
invests  more  than  he  would  do  otherwise.  If  the  leader  is  more 
efficient this  may  still mean  its efforts  are bigger  than  those  of 
the  follower,  consistent with Rosen  (1991) Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  36 
6.  Urgent  issues 
It  is  clear  that  many  more  issues  await  treatment.  More  work  is 
needed  on  asymmetries,  e.g.  exploring  the  impact  of  spillovers  in 
vertical  market  organizations.  In  reality  spillovers  are  to  a 
certain  extent  endogenous  and  this  is  possibly  interacting  with 
exogenous  information  leakage.  De  Fraja  (1993)  modifies  (in 
essence)  the  Stewart  (1983)  racing  model  to  include  technological 
disclosures  (endogenous  spillovers)  in  racing  efforts.  He  shows 
that  symmetric  Nash  commitments  to  full  disclosure  are  likely when 
market  sharing  spillovers  are  high.  When  such  sharing  is  low,  no 
disclosure  obtains.  And  asymmetric  disclosures  are  also  possible, 
when  the  underdog  firm  that  receives  the  smallest  piece  of  the 
innovative  pie  does  not  disclose  and  the  other  does.  In  other 
words,  the  underdog  only  "receives"  information.  This  is  in  line 
with  the  role  playing  tendencies  discussed  above,  and  awaits 
further  investigation. 
The  information  that  can  be  supplied  to  cooperative  partners 
is private and  the  know  how  each  firm  discloses  is non-verifiable, 
so  that  spillovers  cannot  be  contracted  on.  This  asymmetric 
information  may  prevent  research  joint  ventures  from  starting 
(Perez-Castrillo  and  Sandonis(1994)).  Agency  problems  also  root 
in  the  asymmetric  objectives  and  information  between 
and  owners  of  the  firm  or  government  trying 
"researchers" 
to  stimulate 
innovation  (e.g.  Veugelers  and  Kesteloot  (1994),  Cassiman  (1994), 
Vergauwen  (1995)).  Firm  (and  technology  policy)  organizations  are 
a  response  to  these  problems:  and  "competing  on  science  and 
technology  means  competing  on  the  organization  of  information 
(Clark  (1989)).n 
There  is of  course  a  need  for  empirical  testing.  Existing work 
tends  to  look  at  the  broad  spillover  definition  (also  embodied) 
and  next  to  methodological  problems  a  lack  of  adequate  data  is 
striking.  Despite  these  problems,  the  most  robust  finding  is  that Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  37 
R&D  spillovers  are  present  and  their magnitude  may  be  quite  large. 
The  disincentive  effect  is  only  weakly  supported  by  the  data,  but 
this  is  no  surprise  for  theory  (see  above).  More  work will  need  to 
be  done  to  understand  the  mechanisms  of  knowledge  transfer.  To 
this  end,  an  attempt  must  be  made  to  model  the  channels  through 
which  spillovers  occur.  More  work  is also  needed  to  understand  the 
strategic  interaction of  firms  doing  R&D  in similar areas,  with  or 
without  spillovers. 
7.  Conclusion 
The  search  for  exciting  theoretical  I.O.  will  come  from  a 
combination  of  factors.  First,  there  is  a  need  for  patience,  in 
the  sense  that  robustness  is  looked  for  and  that  a  relation  with 
earlier findings  is  explored.  In this  paper  an  attempt  was  made  to 
search  for  general  tendencies  among  specific  models  that  look  at 
spillovers  in  innovative  activities.  A  number  of  inferences 
appeared  in  a  wide  class  of  settings,  including  stochastic  racing 
models,  (static)  stochastic  models,  dynamic  and  static  commitment 
models,  and  strategic  investment  models.  They  all,  for  example, 
"agree"  on  : 
tendencies  summarized  by  Figure  1  and  the  role  of  a  critical 
spillover  level  that  drives  the  comparison  between  symmetric 
cooperative  and  non-cooperative  efforts  since  it  is  crucial  for 
the  sign  of  the  externalities  that  investments  inflicted  on 
rivals; 
the  disincentive  effect  of  symmetric  spillovers  for  strategic 
investments  and  the  positive  effect  of  such  spillovers  for 
investment  commitments  and cooperative efforts; 
Likewise  it  appears  that  innovative  output  In  many  cases  lS 
highest  when  appropriation  lS  neither  perfect  nor  free,  although 
circumstances  also  emerge  where  any  lack  of  appropriation  will 
discourage  innovative  efforts.  These  tendencies  also  appeared  in  a Spillovers and  Innovative Activities  38 
wide  variety  of  settings,  with  lack  of  appropration  corning  from 
low  entry  and  imitation  barriers  or  from  a  high  number  of 
competing rivals. 
Second  there  is  the  need  for  more  inspiration  from  the  demand 
side.  A  high  proportion of  supply  induced  literature is  inevitable 
and  needed,  some  of  the  best  work  simply  comes  from  trying  to 
understand and  trying  to get  things  right.  But  at  the  same  time it 
would  be  nice  to  see  more  demand  induced  work.  In  many  cases  the 
gap  is still very wide  and this  is not  a  new  phenomenon. 
Still  it  seems  like  at  the  European  level  we  are  working 
towards  a  more  developed  scientific  community,  and  the  view  on 
where  we  are  going  is  important.  Some  fear  that  the  European 
science  scene  in  economics  will  move  towards  more  rigor  and  more 
papers  (and  citations)  but  to  less  relevance,  policy influence  and 
support  of  excellent  undergraduate  and  graduate  education  (along 
these  lines,  see  e.g.  Frey  and  Eichenberger  (1993)).  It is  a  point 
well  taken in general  and  for  the  field  of  I.O.  in particular.  But 
we  must  be  optimistic;  once  we  recognize  the  challenge  and  agree 
on  it,  we  can  define  the  problem  and  then  solutions  in  many 
instances  tend  to  suggest  themselves.  Rewarding  inventions  and 
innovation  in  the  profession,  universities  and  research 
institutions  will  be  possible,  if  we  succeed  in  stimulating  and 
internalizing spillovers  on.the  supply  side  (among  scientists)  and 
on  the bridge between  the  demand  side and  science. 
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'In the first volume  of  the  "Journal  of  Economic  Theory"  !. 
2After  some  substitutions,  see  also  Reinganum  (1989),  one  obtains 
a*  =  lin  +  [1- (lin)]  I  P.h'  with  h'>O  the  derivative  of  the 
hazard  function  evaluated  at  the  corresponding  symmetric 
equilibrium  and  p  the  value  of 'the  innovation  at  the  time  of  its 
introduction. 
3  According  to  Roberts  and  Samuelson  (1988),  advertising  on  low  tar 
cigarette brands  appears  to  have  positive market  spillovers,  while 
advertising  on  regular  cigarettes  tend  to  have  only  market  share 
effects. 
4  When  f (p)  is  replaced  by  a  function  that  is  multiplicative 
separable  in  prices,  the  commitment  and  strategic  equilibria 
coincide  (there  is  no  room  for  strategic  use  of  R&D)  (Lee(1986)) 
and adding price equilibria would not  change  the  inferences. 
5  It  can  be  shown  that  with  equal  choices  of  R&D  investments 
sign(D.lnq/D. lnxi) =sign DV/Dxi  =  sign  (a-'ll) 
with  j;i:i,  qi  and  qj  output,  profits  Vj=(p-c) .qj-r.xj,  c  a  constant 
unit  of  cost  of  production  and  r  a  per  unit  cost  for  an  R&D  input 
x j • 
6Motta  also  considers  an  additional  stage  of  entry  and  shows  that 
cooperation may  also allow more  firms  to enter. 
7Arnir  (1994)  points  to  differences  between 
Jacquemin  (1988)  and  Kamien  a.o  (1992)  modelling 
BWith  more  firms  they  will  be  negatively 
spillovers  and  may  be  positively  sloped  for 
the  d'Aspremont-
of spillovers. 
sloped  for  small 
large  spillovers  if 
there are many rivals. 
9  Since it can  be  shown  that  Da*IDn<O  with  a  *  defined  in  footnote 
3. 
10  For  ~>1/2,  ~*=3IbI (6Ib-1)  with r  a  parameter  reflecting  the  cost 
of  development  efforts  and  b  the  slope  of  the  linear  demand  curve 
in a  cost-reducing game  with Cournot  competition. 
11  This  sharing  assumes  no  spillovers.  One  could  extend  their 
analysis  to  include  spillovers  in cost  reduction.  This  should  give 
insights  comparable  to  the  findings  on  a. 
12  Note  that  a  larger  value  'a  implies  a  smaller  spillover.  Stewart 
shows  that non-cooperative  investments  increase with a  for  a~a*. 
13  Some  simulations  seem  to  indicate  that  the  complication  looked 
at by Vonortas  (1994)  does  not  change  the  inferences  made  here.  In 
Choi  (1993)  however  cooperative  investments  appear  to  be 
discouraged by higher spillovers. 
14  With  strategic  investments  and  no  spillovers,  firms  tend  to  have 
lower  profits  than  with  commitment  (open  loop)  (Brander  and 
Spencer  (1983)).  But  spillovers  render  this  comparison  ambiguous 
in general. 
15  In race  settings  with  technological  uncertainty and  winner  takes 
all,  more  rivals  also  discourage  sunk  innovative  investments  that 
increase  the  probability  of  a  breakthrough  in  a  small  time 
interval,  given  that  it did  not  occur  earlier  (Loury  (1979)).  The 
reason  lS  that  more  rivals  reduce  the  expected  revenue  from 
investments  while  the  sunk  cost  remains  the  same,  so  that  a 
disincentive  of  rivalry appears. Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  40 
16  This  setting  however,  assumes  that  current  Cournot  profits  are 
sufficient  to  self-finance  drastic  or  non-drastic  innovations, 
regardless  of  the  number  of  firms  in  the  industry.  Especially 
drastic  improvements  may,  however,  incite  large  innovative  efforts 
and may  consequently create  a  binding self-financing constraint. 
17They  also  show  that  non-cooperative  effective  R&D  typically 
decreases  as  the  number  of  rivals  increases,  since  individual 
efforts are also discouraged by more  rivals. 
1BIn  a  homogeneous  oligopoly  the  maximum  is  also  achieved  for  the 
critical  spillover  ~·=1/2.  For  differentiated  oligopolies  things 
are  a  little bit more  complicated,  see  De  Bondt  a.o.  (1992). 
19  One  reported  exception  is  the  cas.e  of  large  inter-industry 
spillovers $  that  accompany  low  intra-industry spillovers  ~  (Steurs 
(1995)). 
2°The  cooperative  strategic  R&D  levels  are  still  socially 
insufficient  (Suzumura  (1992)).  The  first  best  Xfb  is  obtained  by 
having  a  planner  maximizing  static  welfare.  It  can  be  shown  that 
for  large  ~,  xn  <  X  <  Xfb;  for  small  ~,  x  <  Xfb  <  xn  with  c 
cooperation  and  n  Nash.  It  may  also  be  of  interest  to  compare 
actual  welfare  with  first  best  welfare  (Wfb) ,  by  dividing  the  one 
through  the  other  (W/Wfb).  It  appears  that  welfare  performance 
(W/Wfb)  of  the  non-cooperative  oligopoly,  would  first  increase but 
quickly  decrease  with  increasing  spillovers,  or  with  a  low  number 
of  firms  in  the  industry it would  always  decrease  with  spillovers 
increasing. 
21  Sufficiently  strong  diminishing  returns  tends  to  eliminate  this 
(and stability problems)  in d'Aspremont-Jacquemin  type  of models. 
22  In  the  asymmetric  setting of  De  Bondt  and  Wu  (1995)  with perfect 
information  sharing  in  the  cartel,  member  profits  will  first 
increase  and  then  decrease  with  k.  Member  firms  thus  have  an 
incentive  to  restrict  the  size  of  the  coalition,  possibly  below 
the  one  that  maximizes  consumer  surplus  and  static  welfare.  The 
exact  inference  is  highly  dependent  on  the  information  sharing 
properties. 
"With  cooperation  spillovers  could  result  in  multiproject  scope 
economies  (Van  Cayseele  (1987)). 
24Drastic  innovations  give monopoly  (or  duopoly in case of  a  tie) . Spillovers  and  Innovative Activities  41 
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